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Toward a Human Rights Method for Measuring 
International Copyright Law’s Compliance with 
International Human Rights Law
Saleh Al-Sharieh*
States parties to international copyright instruments are required to give effect to their obli-
gations under international copyright law and fulfil their international human rights obligations 
with respect to striking a balance between the human rights of the authors of intellectual 
works and human rights of the users of those same works. The High Commissioner of Human 
Rights has concluded that such balance ‘is one familiar to intellectual property law’. This con-
clusion assumes that international copyright law is already compliant with international human 
rights law. However, international copyright law instruments are not clear about how to reach 
an appropriate balance between these rights and, as a result, different stakeholders in the 
international copyright community seek and defend varied versions of balance which are not 
necessarily consistent. Concurrently, international human rights law bodies and scholars have 
examined the human rights of authors and users of intellectual works through a copyright law 
lens, missing a chance to articulate a clear human rights principle of balance. A proper human 
rights balance between authors’ and users’ human rights recognises the limited nature of both 
sets of human rights, rejects any hierarchy between them, and interprets them in conformity 
with the notion of the interdependence and indivisibility of human rights.
Keywords: Human Rights; Intellectual Property; Copyright; TRIPS; Compliance
I. Introduction
International human rights law has specific requirements for the protection of authors and users of intel-
lectual works. Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)1 and Article 15(1) of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)2 protect ‘the moral and material 
interests’3 of authors (hereinafter authors’ moral and material interests) and the human rights of individuals 
to ‘participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement 
and its benefits’4 (hereinafter users’ rights in culture, arts and science). Furthermore, by virtue of the inter-
dependence and indivisibility of human rights,5 authors can derive protection from other human rights and 
freedoms, such as the right to freedom of expression and the right to property.6 Likewise, users can support 
 * Researcher, European Technology Law and Human Rights Division, Department of European and Economic Law, University of 
Groningen (the Netherlands).
 1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR).
 2 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 
993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR).
 3 UDHR, art 27(2); ICESCR, art 15(1)(c).
 4 UDHR, art 27(1); ICESCR, art 15(1)(a)-(b).
 5 See World Conference on Human Rights, ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action’ (12 July 1993) UN Doc A/CONF.157/23 
(Vienna Declaration), para 5.
 6 Hereinafter, authors’ moral and material interests in Article 27(2) of the UDHR and in Article 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR as well as 
authors’ claims to protect these interests under the human rights to freedom of expression and property are collectively referred to 
as ‘authors’ human rights’. For a discussion of the content of authors’ rights in international human rights law, see United Nations 
(UN) Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), ‘General Comment No. 17 (2005): The Right of Everyone to Ben-
efit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of which 
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their rights to access, use and share intellectual works by relying on their freedom of expression and their 
human right to education.7 
Given the indivisibility and interdependence of human rights, the human rights of authors and users are 
presumed to be compatible as codified in international human rights instruments. Nonetheless, the practice 
of these rights by individuals, their implementation by parliaments, and/or their adjudication by courts may 
result in one (or more) of these rights intruding on the other(s). In this case, international human rights law 
posits balance as the solution for managing the relationship between authors’ and users’ human rights, and 
between these two sets of rights and the whole body of international human rights. In General Comment 
No. 17, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has explained that authors’ inter-
national human rights ‘must be balanced’ with the other international human rights recognised in the 
ICESCR, including users’ international human rights.8 Also, the High Commissioner of Human Rights has 
relied on the temporary nature of intellectual property rights and their traditional utilitarian justifications 
to conclude that the balance that international human rights law strikes ‘between public and private inter-
ests’9 in intellectual works is ‘one familiar to intellectual property law’10 and thus ‘there is a degree of com-
patibility between Article 15 [of the ICESCR] and traditional [intellectual property] systems’.11 The High 
Commissioner has emphasised the role that balance, as an objective of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights12 (TRIPS), plays in establishing a ‘potential link’13 between TRIPS and 
international human rights law.14 Yet, the High Commissioner has also identified a number of points in 
TRIPS that are a source of concern from an international human rights law perspective.15 
The High Commissioner’s reliance on the international copyright law’s principle of balance to issue a 
decree of coexistence between international copyright law and international human rights law is problem-
atic. The principle of balance in international copyright law is not as self-evident as generally perceived. It 
is ambiguous and is far from being agreed upon as satisfactory within international copyright law, making 
it a poor candidate to be imported as a viable peacemaker between the two regimes. Second, the High 
Commissioner has not articulated an independent human rights principle of balance—with clear rules—that 
can contribute to managing the multifaceted and interrelated tensions resulting from the interplay between 
authors’ and users’ human rights and which can act as point of reference against which international copy-
right law can measure its compliance with international human rights norms. 
The purpose of this paper is to unfold the complexity surrounding the meaning of balance in international 
copyright law and present the principle of balance in international human rights law. This should inform a 
new debate with respect to how to measure the compliance of international copyright law with international 
He or She Is the Author (Article 15, Paragraph 1(C), of the Covenant’ (12 January 2006) UN Doc E/C.12/GC/17 (General Comment 
No. 17). General Comments are:
‘[A] means by which a UN human rights expert committee distils its considered views on an issue which arises out of the 
provisions of the treaty, whose implementation it supervises and presents those views in the context of a formal statement 
of its understanding to which it attaches major importance.’
  Philip Alston, ‘The Historical Origins of “General Comments” in Human Rights Law’ in L Boisson de Chazournes and V Gowland 
(eds), The International Legal System in Quest of Equity and Universality: Liber Amicorum Georges Abi-Saab (Martinus Nijhoff 2001) 
764. There is a disagreement on their legal weight, which Professor Philip Alston summarises as follows:
[There are views] that seek to portray them as authoritative interpretations of the relevant treaty norms, through others 
that see them as a de facto equivalent of advisory opinions which are to be treated with seriousness but no more, to highly 
critical approaches that classify them as broad, unsystematic statements which are not always well founded, and are not 
deserving of being accorded any particular weight in legal settings. ibid 764.
 
 7 Hereinafter, users’ rights in culture, arts and science in article 27(1) of the UDHR and in article 15(1)(a)-(b) of the ICESCR as well 
as users’ claims to protect these rights under the human rights to freedom of expression and education are collectively referred to 
as ‘users’ human rights’. For a discussion of the content of users’ human rights, see UNCESCR, ‘General Comment No. 21: Right of 
Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life (art. 15, para. 1 (a), of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)’ 
(21 December 2009) UN Doc E/C.12/GC/21 (General Comment No. 21).
 8 General Comment No. 17 (n 6) para 22.
 9 UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) (Sub-Commission), ‘The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights on Human Rights: Report of the High Commissioner’ (27 June 2001) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (Report 
of the High Commissioner), para 11.
 10 ibid.
 11 ibid para 12.
 12 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 33 
ILM 1144, Annex 1C, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) art 7.
 13 Report of the High Commissioner (n 9) para 16.
 14 ibid.
 15 ibid paras 22–26.
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human rights law. The paper is divided into five parts: Part II outlines the different human rights approaches 
to intellectual property law; Part III reveals the ambiguity of the principle of balance in international copy-
right law; Part IV presents the human rights principle of balance; and Part V is a conclusion.
II. International Human Rights and Intellectual Property: The Rhetoric on 
Conflict and Coexistence
The relationship between international human rights law and international intellectual property law is 
complex,16 and for a long time both legal communities paid little attention to this complexity.17 Thus, 
in 1998, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), in collaboration with the United Nations 
(UN) Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), organised a ‘Panel Discussion on 
Intellectual Property and Human Rights’.18 The handful of papers presented in the panel generated a new 
stream of research looking into international intellectual property law through an international human 
rights lens.19
The early theme of research on the relationship between intellectual property and human rights focused 
on finding whether the two systems are conflicting or coexisting.20 Specifically, Resolution 2000/721 declared 
that an apparent conflict exists between intellectual property and human rights: international intellectual 
property law, as embodied in TRIPS, ‘does not adequately reflect the fundamental nature and indivisibility of 
all human rights, including the right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applica-
tions, the right to health, the right to food and the right to self-determination’.22 Given this incompatibility, 
the Sub-Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights reminded governments of ‘the 
primacy of human rights obligations over economic policies and agreements’.23 The catalyst for Resolution 
2000/7 was a joint statement by the Habitat International Coalition and the Lutheran World Federation,24 
which urged the Sub-Commission to ‘take concrete actions on TRIP[S]’25, whereby the Commission ‘must 
reassert the primacy of human rights obligations over the commercial and profit-driven motives upon which 
agreements such as TRIP[S] are based’.26 
Furthermore, several early scholars’ arguments supported the conclusions of Resolution 2000/7. For 
example, scholars argue that: international intellectual property protection is generally conflicting with the 
human right to development;27 the strong patent protection over genetically modified crops could under-
mine the human right to food;28 international patent protection hinders access to medicine and thus is 
 16 Jakob Cornides, ‘Human Rights and Intellectual Property-Conflict or Convergence?’ (2004) 7 JWIP 135, 137; Peter K Yu, ‘Intellectual 
Property and Human Rights in the Nonmultilateral Era’ (2012) 64 Fla L Rev 1045, 1045.
 17 Laurence R Helfer and Graeme Austin, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Mapping the Global Interface (CUP 2011) 1.
 18 WIPO and OHCHR (eds), Intellectual Property and Human Rights: Panel Discussion to Commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (WIPO 1999). 
 19 See eg Audrey R Chapman, ‘Approaching Intellectual Property as a Human Right: Obligations Related to Article 15(1)(c)’ (2001) 
35 Copyright Bull 4; Laurence R Helfer, ‘Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?’ (2003–2004) 5 Minn 
Intell Prop Rev 47; Paul Torremans (ed), Copyright and Human Rights: Freedom of Expression, Intellectual Property, Privacy (KLI 
2004); Mpazi Sinjela, Human Rights and Intellectual Property Rights: Tensions and Convergences (Martinus Nijhoff 2007); Peter K 
Yu, ‘Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework’ (2007) 40 UC Davis L Rev 1039; Laurence R 
Helfer, ‘Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property’ (2007) 40 UC Davis L Rev 971; Willem Grosheide (ed), Intel-
lectual Property and Human Rights: A Paradox (Edward Elgar 2010); Helfer and Austin (n 17); Yu, ‘Nonmultilateral Era’ (n 16).
 20 See eg Helfer, ‘Conflict or Coexistence?’ (n 19) 48–49.
 21 UNCHR (Sub-Commission), ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights: Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution 
2000/7’ (17 August 2000) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7 (Resolution 2000/7).
 22 ibid para 2.
 23 ibid para 3.
 24 David Weissbrodt and Kell Schoff, ‘Human Rights Approach to Intellectual Property Protection: The Genesis and Application of 
Sub-Commission Resolution 2000/7’ (2003) 5 Minn Intell Prop Rev 1, 26.
 25 UNCHR (Sub-Commission), ‘The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Joint Written Statement- Submitted by Habi-
tat International Coalition and the Lutheran World Federation, non-governmental organisations in special consultative status’ (28 
July 2000) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/NGO/14, 6.
 26 ibid.
 27 See eg Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR), Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights: Integrating 
Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy (CIPR 2002) 6 (noting the additional costs that intellectual property protec-
tion imposes on developing countries ‘at the expense of the essential prerequisites of life for poor people’); Peter Drahos, ‘The 
Universality of Intellectual Property Rights: Origins and Developments’ in WIPO and OHCHR (eds), Intellectual Property and Human 
Rights: Panel Discussion to Commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (WIPO 1999) 27 (noting 
‘considerable tension between intellectual property rights and the right to development’).
 28 See eg Peter Straub, ‘Farmers in the IP Wrench––How Patents on Gene-Modified Crops Violate the Right to Food in Developing 
Countries’ (2006) 29 Hastings Int’l & Comp L Rev 187. See also Michael Blakeney, Intellectual Property Rights and Food Security 
(CABI 2009) 15 (noting the presence of a tension between intellectual property and the right to food); Annette Kur, Intellectual 
Property Rights in a Fair World Trade System: Proposals for Reform of TRIPS (Edward Elgar 2011) 285 (arguing that patenting of 
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injurious to the human right to health;29 international copyright and patent laws overlook the human rights 
of indigenous people over their traditional knowledge;30 and copyright law is in conflict with the human 
right to freedom of expression31 and the human right to education.32
On the other hand, the second view on the relationship between international human rights and interna-
tional intellectual property law spots a ‘degree of compatibility’33 between the two regimes.34 According to 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, this compatibility is ascribed to the similarity of the balance that 
both systems pursue between the private interests in protecting intellectual works and the public interest in 
providing access to those works.35 Particularly, in the context of copyright, this balance means giving authors 
exclusive rights over their intellectual works while simultaneously creating set of exceptions and limitations 
which enable the public to access those works.36 For example, copyright exceptions and limitations under 
international copyright law, such as the quotation exception and the expression/idea dichotomy, challenge 
the claim that a conflict exists between copyright and freedom of expression.37 Similarly, in international 
patent and trademarks laws, exceptions and limitations to exclusive rights give rise to the claim that the two 
regimes are compliant with international human rights law.38
The coexistence perspective on intellectual property law and human rights assumes that the principle of 
balance in international copyright law is clear and imports it to manage the tension between authors’ and 
users’ human rights. However, given the plethora of meanings of the term balance in international copy-
right law, this perspective overestimates the maturity of the principle of balance in international copyright 
law and therefore also overestimates its possible role in international human rights law.
III. Balance in International Copyright Law: The Controversy
One of the reasons for the inherent tension between the protection of authors’ and users’ rights in inter-
national copyright law is the absence of an overarching purpose in reconciling both interests.39 National 
copyright laws have mainly emerged from either the common law tradition of copyright or the civil law 
system of ‘droit d’auteur’.40 While the first is utilitarian in nature, as it envisages copyright as a mechanism 
genetically modified crops could make developing countries more dependent on imported seeds, a situation implying some ten-
sion between international patent law and the human right to self-determination).
 29 See eg UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the 
Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health’ (31 March 2009) UN Doc A/HRC/11/12, para 94 (concluding that the 
impact of TRIPS and bilateralism on medicine availability and pricing has complicated States’ task to respect, protect, and fulfill the 
human right to health); Philippe Cullet, ‘Patents and Medicines: The Relationship between TRIPS and the Human Right to Health’ 
(2003) 79 Int’l Aff 139, 160 (concluding that possible conflicts exist between drug patenting and the human right to health and 
that this conflict ought to be resolved in favour of the human right to health).
 30 See eg Peter Drahos, ‘Indigenous Knowledge, Intellectual Property and Biopiracy: Is a Global Biocollecting Society the Answer?’ 
(2000) 22(6) EIPR 245, 247; James T Gathii, ‘Rights, Patents, Markets and the Global Aids Pandemic’ (2002) 14 Fla J Int’l L 261, 319; 
Manuela Cameiro da Cunha, ‘International Bodies and Traditional Knowledge’ in Sophia Twarog and Promila Kapoor (eds), Protect-
ing and Promoting Traditional Knowledge: Systems, National Experiences and International Dimensions (UN Publications 2004) 91.
 31 See eg P Bernt Hugenholtz, ‘Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe’ in Rochelle C Dreyfuss, Diane L Zimmerman and 
Harry First (eds), Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society (OUP 2001) 343; 
UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression’ 
(16 May 2011) UN DOC A/HRC/17/27, para 78 (concluding that disconnecting users from accessing the internet on grounds of 
intellectual property law violations is not a justified restriction on freedom of expression).
 32 See eg International Symposium on the Information Society, Human Dignity and Human Rights, ‘Statement on Human Rights, 
Human Dignity and the Information Society’ (2005) 18 RQDI 221, para 26 (stating that international intellectual property law 
‘should not prevail over the right to education and knowledge’).
 33 Report of the High Commissioner (n 9) para 12.
 34 ibid.
 35 ibid para 11. See also Estelle Derclaye, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights: Coinciding and Cooperating’ in Paul LC 
Torremans (ed), Intellectual Property and Human Rights: Enhanced Edition of Copyright and Human Rights (KLI 2008) 134 (arguing 
that intellectual property rights and human rights ‘coexist’, ‘coincide’ and ‘cooperate’).
 36 Daniel J Gervais, ‘Intellectual Property and Human Rights: Learning to Live Together’ in Paul LC Torremans (ed), Intellectual Prop-
erty and Human Rights: Enhanced Edition of Copyright and Human Rights (KLI 2008) 3.
 37 Derclaye (n 35) 142.
 38 Hans M Haugen, The Right to Food and the TRIPS Agreement: With a Particular Emphasis on Developing Countries’ Measures for 
Food Production and Distribution (Koninklijke Brill 2007) 376; Lisa P Ramsey, ‘Free Speech and International Obligations to Protect 
Trademarks’ (2010) 35 Yale J Int’l L 405, 415; Kristen Osenga, ‘Get the Balance Right: Squaring Access with Patent Protection’ (2012) 
25 Pac McGeorge Global Bus & Dev LJ 309, 320–321.
 39 Guido Westkamp, ‘The “Three-Step Test” and Copyright Limitations in Europe: European Copyright Law between Approximation 
and National Decision Making’ (2008) 56 J Copyright Soc’y USA 1, 37. 
 40 Tom Braegelmann, ‘Copyright Law in and under the Constitution: The Constitutional Scope and Limits to Copyright Law in 
the United States in Comparison with the Scope and Limits Imposed by Constitutional and European Law on Copyright Law in 
 Germany’ (2009) 27 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 99, 101. Notably, Canada has a hybrid copyright system that combines both regimes.
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to stimulate copyright holders to produce and disseminate works for the benefit of the public interest, the 
second sees copyright as the authors’ natural right.41 
In 1886, the founders of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne 
Convention)42 opted for the natural law argument as a basis for international copyright protection.43 The 
declared purpose of the Berne Convention was the ‘protection of the rights of authors in their literary and 
artistic works’.44 However, TRIPS brought a bundle of new objectives and principles to international copy-
right law. The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in TRIPS target the advancement 
of ‘technological innovation’, ‘the transfer and dissemination of technology’, the benefit of both ‘producers 
and users’ and the ‘balance of rights and obligations’.45 Subsequent international copyright instruments also 
refer to balance. The WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT)46 and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 
(WPPT)47 acknowledge ‘the need to maintain a balance between the rights of authors [and the rights of per-
formers and producers of phonograms] and the larger public interest, particularly education, research and 
access to information [. . .]’.48 The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)49 adopts, mutatis mutandis, 
the objectives and principles of TRIPS including the objective of balance.50
The Oxford dictionary defines the noun ‘balance’ as ‘a situation in which different elements are equal or in 
the correct proportions’51 and defines the verb ‘balance’ as to ‘offset or compare the value of (one thing) with 
another’.52 Early on, Lord Mansfield envisaged these meanings as both a function and a purpose of copyright 
law when he stated:
‘We must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, 
who have employed their time for the service of the community, may not be deprived of their just 
merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world may not be deprived 
of improvements, nor the progress of the art be retarded.’53
At first glance, balance resembles a traditional fair and desired allocation of the rights and freedoms of both 
authors and users over intellectual works.54 It is supposed to be the ideal point at which neither users’ enjoy-
ment of intellectual works discourages authors from creation, nor authors’ exclusive rights hinder that enjoy-
ment.55 This includes the users’ ability to utilise available intellectual works to produce additional new works.56 
 41 For a general comparison between the two systems, see Rudolf Monta, ‘The Concept of “Copyright” versus the “Droit D’auteur”’ 
(1959) 32 S Cal L Rev 177.
 42 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (adopted 9 September 1886, entered into force 4 December 
1887, revised 24 July 1971) 828 UNTS 221 (Berne Convention).
 43 L Ray Patterson, ‘What’s Wrong With Eldred? An Essay on Copyright Jurisprudence’ (2003) 10 J Intell Prop L 345, 352.
 44 Berne Convention art 1.
 45 TRIPS art 7.
 46 WIPO Copyright Treaty (adopted 20 December 1996, entered into force 6 March 2002) 36 ILM 65 (WCT).
 47 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (adopted 20 December 1996, entered into force 20 May 2002) 36 ILM 76 (WPPT).
 48 WCT pmbl; WPPT pmbl.
 49 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (adopted 3 December 2010, opened for signature 1 May 2011) 50 ILM 243 (ACTA).
 50 ibid art 2(3).
 51 Oxford Dictionary of English (3rd edn) 123.
 52 ibid.
 53 Sayre v Moore (1785) 1 East 361, 362. See also Christophe Geiger, Jonathan Griffiths and Reto M Hilty, ‘Declaration on a Balanced 
Interpretation of the “Three-Step Test” in Copyright Law’ (2008) 39(6) IIC 707, 709 (stressing that balance is a ‘general objective’ 
of copyright law as evidenced by article 7 of TRIPS and the preamble of the WCT). The Three-Step Test governs the introduction of 
copyright exceptions and limitations in international copyright law: Berne Convention art 9(2):
It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special 
cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author; 
  TRIPS art 13: 
Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a 
normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.
  For a discussion of the Three-Step Test, see Martin Senftleben, Copyright, Limitations and the Three-Step Test: An Analysis of the 
Three-Step Test in International and EC Copyright Law (KLI 2004).
 54 Sean J Griffith, ‘Internet Regulation through Architectural Modification: The Property Rule Structure of Code Solutions’ (1999) 112 
Harv L Rev 1634, 1652. 
 55 Sayre v Moore (n 53) 362; Théberge v Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc, 2002 SCC 34, [2002] 2 SCR 336 [31]. See also Lateef 
Mtima and Steven D Jamar, ‘Fulfilling the Copyright Social Justice Promise: Digitizing Textual Information’ (2010) 55 NYL Sch L Rev 
77, 106 (giving Google Books project as an example of an ‘optimum copyright balance’ between authors and users of intellectual 
works in the digital environment).
 56 ibid.
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Users have traditionally relied upon this balance to claim rights over intellectual works, and both lawmakers 
and courts have occasionally entertained these rights by relying on the normative support of the term bal-
ance.57 Therefore, the reference to balance in TRIPS has denoted a shift of international copyright law from 
being solely the law of authors into being the law of both authors and users.58
Balance is now a cornerstone concept in the dialogue surrounding international copyright law and policy. 
However, TRIPS, the WCT, the WPPT and ACTA do not provide a unified definition of balance and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) case law has not played the needed role to clarify the meaning of balance or 
how balance may be achieved. The Appellate Body in Canada–Term of Patent Protection emphasised that 
Article 7 and Article 8 of TRIPS ‘still await appropriate interpretation.’59 Yet, in Canada–Patent Protection of 
Pharmaceutical Products60 the panel briefly identified two types of balance in TRIPS. The first type of bal-
ance exists in the bundle of the rights and obligations in TRIPS’s provisions resulting from the deal struck 
by its negotiations, such as in Article 28,61 specifying the rights conferred by a patent.62 The second type of 
balance results from Member States’ implementation of TRIPS’s provisions by utilising its flexibilities to an 
extent that does not renegotiate the first mentioned balance.63 In this case, the challenged flexibility was 
the proper interpretation of the scope of Article 30 of TRIPS, which allows introducing exceptions to patent 
protection ‘provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of 
the legitimate interests of third parties’.64 
In scholarship, there is a controversy over balance’s meaning and role in international copyright law. One 
view denies balance’s existence and role as a model to manage authors’ rights and users’ rights in interna-
tional copyright law due to the power inequality between copyright holders in the developed world and 
users in the less-developed world.65 On the other hand, there is wide acknowledgement of the importance 
of balance in international copyright law despite its complexity.66 Yet, the amount of balance required is not 
self-evident and needs identification in international copyright law. In this regard, Professor Daniel Gervais 
argues that a number of balances need to be struck not only within the international copyright law regime 
but also within a ‘copyright whole’.67 The copyright whole would include balancing between copyright rights 
and other rights with which it is ‘sparring’ and which are regulated by other areas of the law, such as the right 
of free expression, the right to privacy, the right to access to knowledge and the right to development.68 For 
 57 See eg The Committee on Commerce, ‘Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998’ (105th Congress, 1997–1998) (HR Rep No 
105–551(II)) 26 (describing balance as the ‘bedrock’ of intellectual property law in the United States); Théberge (n 55) [75] (holding 
that ‘the balance of rights and interests [. . .] lie at the basis of copyright law’); Pamela Samuelson, ‘Does Information Really Have 
to be Licensed?’ (1998) 41:9 Communications of the ACM 15, 15 (noting that copyright law includes ‘a longstanding tradition’ of 
establishing balance between copyright holders and the public consumers of copyrighted works). 
 58 Pascal Lamy, ‘Conclusions’ (International Conference on the 10th Anniversary of the WTO TRIPS, Brussels, 24 June 2004).
 59 WTO, Canada–Term of Patent Protection (Complaint by the United States) (18 September 2000) WT/DS170/AB/R [101].
 60 WTO, Canada–Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (Complaint by the European Communities and their member States) 
(17 March 2000) WT/DS114/R.
 61 TRIPS art 28:
1.  A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights:
   (a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent from the 
acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing (6) for these purposes that product;
   (b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent from the 
act of using the process and from the acts of: using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at least 
the product obtained directly by that process.
2.   Patent owners shall also have the right to assign, or transfer by succession, the patent and to conclude licensing 
contracts.
 
 62 Canada–Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (n 60) [7.26].
 63 ibid.
 64 TRIPS art 30.
 65 See eg Alan Story, ‘Burn Berne: Why the Leading International Copyright Convention Must Be Repealed’ (2003) 40 Hous L Rev 763, 
767.
 66 See eg William M Landes and Richard A Posner, ‘An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law’ (1989) 18 J Legal Stud 325, 326 (arguing 
that striking the correct balance between the incentive given to authors to produce (and disseminate) intellectual works and the 
value of affording access to these works is the core problem in copyright law); Pascal Lamy, ‘Speech’ (International Conference 
on the 10th Anniversary of the WTO TRIPS, Brussels, 24 June 2004) (arguing that achieving balance is the core of international 
copyright policy); Graeme Dinwoodie, ‘The WIPO Copyright Treaty: A Transition to the Future of International Copyright Lawmak-
ing?’ (2010) 57 Case W Res L Rev 751, 757–758 (arguing that ‘balance is a more complex organism than we might expect or might 
assume’).
 67 Daniel Gervais, ‘Fair Use, Fair Dealing, Fair Principles: Efforts To Conceptualize Exceptions and Limitations To Copyright’ (2010) 57 
J Copyright Soc’y USA 499, 503.
 68 ibid.
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Professor Graeme Dinwoodie, however, balance in international copyright law is the preservation of States’ 
autonomy in designing their national copyright regimes in light of their socio-economic objectives and the 
minimum standards of protection required by international copyright law.69 This form of balance is not 
satisfactory for public domain advocates who argue that TRIPS’s exceptions and limitations—the flexibilities 
which are supposed to preserve States’ autonomy in devising balanced copyright norms—are not of the same 
type of exceptions and limitations known in common-law copyright regimes, such as fair use.70 Thus, these 
flexibilities are incapable of enabling balanced copyright protection.71 In contrast, Professor Jane Ginsburg 
is critical of the latter’s view because it gives the concept of balance the form of ‘cutting back on exclusive 
rights’72 or emphasising ‘users’ rights’.73 She criticises the European Copyright Code74 on this ground and 
argues that the traditional split between the civil law and common law copyright traditions have been 
replaced with ‘the tension between authors’ rights and user rights, with the latter orientation appearing to 
prevail.’75
In light of the controversy over the meaning of balance in international copyright law, various stakehold-
ers identify and defend varied versions of balance which not necessarily consistent. For example, States 
interested in strong copyright (or the so-called maximalists)76 have argued that strong copyright protection 
for authors, especially in the digital environment, is important to create balance in international copyright 
law.77 On the other hand, some developing countries and public domain advocates (collectively referred to 
as the Access to Knowledge (A2K) Movement78) have complained that the maximalists are shifting inter-
national copyright law away from the proper balance, which implies the advent of a new enclosure move-
ment to lock down culture.79 Therefore, they have called for balancing international copyright protection 
and enforcement against users’ rights to use intellectual works.80 At the same time, they have opposed any 
new international norms that may strengthen copyright protection and enforcement. For example, in an 
intervention made in the WTO TRIPS Council with respect to ACTA, China’s representative has argued that 
‘TRIPS-plus enforcement trends in RTAs [regional trade agreements], FTAs [free trade agreements] and ACTA 
would reduce the balance of interests that the TRIPS Agreement had tried to establish’.81 Similarly, India’s 
representative has warned that ACTA’s rules have the potential to ‘completely upset the balance of rights and 
obligations of the TRIPS Agreement’.82
Despite the controversy surrounding balance in international copyright law, the meaning of balance has 
shaped the framework invoked in international human rights law to manage the tensions between authors’ 
 69 Dinwoodie (n 66) 755–756.
 70 See eg 17 USC § 107 (2012).
 71 See eg Ruth Okediji, ‘Toward an International Fair Use doctrine’ (2000) 39 Colum J Transnat’l L 75, 82.
 72 Jane C Ginsburg, ‘“European Copyright Code” - Back to First Principles (with Some Additional Detail)’ (2011) 58 J Copyright Soc’y 
USA 265, 267.
 73 ibid.
 74 <http://www.copyrightcode.eu/index.php?websiteid=3> accessed 6 July 2015.
 75 Ginsburg, ‘European Copyright Code’ (n 72) 266.
 76 Generally, intellectual property maximalists, such as the United States, European Union (EU) and Japan, call for longer, wider 
and stronger protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. They argue that strong copyright stimulates creativity 
and innovation and thus generates economic growth. And, they are not supportive of access to knowledge initiatives. For further 
discussion of the maximalists’ agenda see Debora Halbert, ‘The Politics of IP Maximalism’ (2011) 3 WIPOJ 81. See also James Boyle, 
‘Enclosing the Genome: What the Squabbles over Genetic Patents Could Teach Us’ in Kieff F Scott (ed), Perspectives on Properties 
of the Human Genome Project (Academic Press 2003) 107–108 (referring to ‘maximalists’ as ‘high protectionists’ and, on the other 
hand, to ‘minimalists’ as the ones concerned with the public domain).
 77 See eg Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), ‘ACTA Fact Sheet and Guide to Public Draft Text’ (October 2010) 
<http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2010/acta-fact-sheet-and-guide-public-draft-text> accessed 6 July 2015 
(stating that ACTA’s section on the enforcement of copyright in the digital environment includes a section that establishes a ‘bal-
anced framework that addresses the challenge of copyright piracy on digital networks while preserving fundamental principles 
such as freedom of expression, fair process and privacy’).
 78 For a discussion of A2K and its movement see generally the collection of articles in Gaëlle Krikorian and Amy Kapczynski (eds), 
Access to Knowledge in the Age of Intellectual Property (Zone Books 2010).
 79 See eg Yochai Benkler, ‘Free as the Air to the Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain’ 74 
(1999) NYU L Rev 354; James Boyle, ‘The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain’ (2003) 66 LCP 
33; Peter K Yu, ‘The International Enclosure Movement’ (2007) 82 Ind LJ 827. 
 80 See eg WIPO, ‘Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the Establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO’ (27 August 2004) WO/
GA/31/11. Twelve countries—Group of Friends of Development—supported the proposal of Argentina and Brazil. Those are: Argen-
tina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Iran, Kenya, Peru, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uruguay & 
Venezuela. See WIPO, ‘Proposal to Establish a Development Agenda for WIPO: An Elaboration of Issues Raised in Document WO/
GA/31/11’ (6 April 2005) IIM/1/4. See also ‘Proposal for Treaty of Access to Knowledge’ (10 May 2005) Knowledge Ecology Inter-
national <http://www.keionline.org/content/view/235/1> accessed 6 July 2015.
 81 WTO (Council for TRIPS), ‘Minutes of Meeting’ (8–9 June 2010) IP/C/M/63, para 256.
 82 ibid para 273.
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and users’ human rights or between these human rights and other interests. Historically, the drafters of 
the UDHR and ICESCR looked at authors’ and users’ human rights through a copyright lens. Advocates of a 
provision on authors’ moral and material interests in the UDHR and ICESCR advanced a natural law argu-
ment similar to that usually invoked to justify copyright. During the drafting of the UDHR, René Cassin, 
the representative of France, sought to provide authors of literary, artistic and scientific works with a ‘just 
remuneration for their labour’ and a ‘moral right’ that safeguards the integrity of their intellectual works 
even after the expiry of the works’ term of protection and their fall into the public domain.83 
Similar to the drafting history of the UDHR, the proposal for a provision on authors’ moral and material 
interests in the ICESCR was influenced by the Lockean and personality views of copyright. For example, 
Jacques Havet, the representative of the UNESCO, in his proposal of the initial text of Article 15(1)(c) of the 
ICESCR, argued that the protection of authors’ moral and material interests ‘represented a safeguard and an 
encouragement for those who were constantly enriching the cultural heritage of mankind’84 and that ‘[o]nly 
by such means could international cultural exchanges be fully developed’.85 
In fact, the supporters of a provision on authors’ interests intended to provide authors’ interests with 
stronger protection than previously existing international copyright law. They envisaged a regime that: 
grants authors stronger control over their intellectual works—similar to the control of owners of tangi-
ble property—; provides a stronger international enforcement of copyright than the Berne Convention; 
and goes beyond the minimum protection levels of the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright 
Convention (UCC). For example, Argentina, Venezuela, Peru, Brazil and Ecuador endorsed the second 
paragraph of Article 27 of the UDHR because they perceived it as a move toward internationalising copy-
right law.86
 Taking a similar position, but on different grounds, Campos Ortiz, the Mexican representative, 
responded to those who had argued that authors’ rights were adequately protected by national and 
international copyright law regimes by stating that ‘the effectiveness of such protection was at best rel-
ative and often non-existent; [therefore,] the United Nations should put its moral authority behind pro-
tecting all forms of work, manual as well as intellectual’.87 For him, this meant that the UN should put 
more effort into the protection of ‘intellectual production on an equal basis with material property’.88 
This view perceives authors’ moral and material interests in international human rights law as a tool 
to strengthen authors’ protection in international copyright law, rather than as a new set of human 
rights. This goal was also present during the drafting of Article 15(1)(c). For example, the representa-
tive of Uruguay cited the lack of the international protection of authors’ rights and the prevalence of 
piracy as amongst the reasons supporting his proposal for a provision on the protection of authors’ 
moral and material interests.89
 More recently, the CESCR has taken a copyright approach in its interpretation of the content of the 
authors’ moral interests, which is an essential component of any balance to be struck between the authors’ 
and the users’ human rights. Following in the footsteps of Article 6bis(1) of the Berne Convention,90 the 
CESCR has identified the rights of attribution and integrity as the authors’ moral interests.91 However, in 
addition to these rights, authors should also be entitled to: decide whether they want to disclose their 
expressions; stop these expressions from circulation when they wish; and to make whatever modifications 
necessary for maintaining the integrity of their works. Such rights derive support from the same justification 
 83 UNCHR, (Drafting Committee) ‘International Bill of Rights: Revised Suggestions Submitted by the Representative of France for 
Articles of the International Declaration of Rights’ (1947) UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/W.2/Rev.2 (1947) art 38.
 84 Jacques L Havet quoted in UNCESCR, ‘Drafting History of the Article 15(1)(c) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Background Paper submitted by Maria Green’ (9 October 2000) UN Doc E/C.12/2000/15, para 21.
 85 ibid.
 86 Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent (UPP 1999) 221.
 87 Campos Ortiz quoted in Morsink (n 86) 221.
 88 ibid.
 89 Representative of Uruguay quoted in Green (n 84) para 35.
 90 Berne Convention art 6bis(1): 
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right 
to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory 
action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
 
 91 General Comment No. 17 (n 6) para 13.
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of authors’ rights of attribution and integrity, namely the protection of the author’s personality reflected in 
the intellectual work.92
Furthermore, the High Commissioner for Human Rights concluded that a ‘degree of compatibility’ exists 
between international human rights and international intellectual property law due to the similarity of 
the balance that both systems pursue between the private interests in protecting intellectual works and 
the public interest in providing access to those works.93 This balances authors’ exclusive rights over their 
intellectual works with a set of exceptions and limitations enabling access.94 Notably, this is the essence of 
the advocates’ argument regarding the coexistence between international human rights and international 
intellectual property.95
To sum up, the premise that there is a degree of compatibility between international intellectual prop-
erty law and international human rights law, due to the similarity between the balance that both intend 
to achieve by means of the copyright/exception formula, is problematic because balance in international 
copyright law is not self-evident. Similarly, international human rights law should shape the norms of inter-
national copyright law, not vice versa. Therefore, there is a need to clarify the meaning of balance in inter-
national human rights law, in the context of the relationship between authors’ and users’ human rights, 
before comparing it with balance in international copyright law. The following section addresses this issue.
IV. The Requirement of Balance in Managing the Rights of Authors and 
Users (and other Human Rights) in International Human Rights Law
In their recognition of both authors’ moral and material interests and users’ rights in culture, arts and sci-
ence over intellectual works, Articles 27 of the UDHR and 15 of the ICESCR do not allude to the existence of 
any tension between these rights and, accordingly, make no reference to the need for balance. Hence, there 
is a view that the drafters created a tension in Article 15 of the ICESCR and Article 27 of the UDHR without 
describing how to resolve it or, alternatively, the drafters may have viewed authors’ human rights over intel-
lectual works as being inferior to users’ human rights.96
The drafters of the UDHR and ICESCR did not intend to give lower weight to authors’ moral and material 
interests. These rights are fully developed in both form and substance. In form, authors’ moral and material 
interests in Article 27 of the UDHR and Article 15 of ICESCR are not set out as exceptions to users’ rights. 
That is, the structure of the articles does not reflect any hierarchy between authors’ moral and material 
interests and users’ rights in culture, arts and science. In substance, both articles grant authors all the rights 
accrued from their intellectual works, namely moral and material rights. These rights are as relevant to 
human dignity as any other human right, such as the right to life or freedom of expression. They also have 
an essential role in facilitating users’ rights in culture, arts and science. Moreover, there are more persuasive 
explanations of why the drafters of the UDHR and ICESCR did not address balance as a solution of the pos-
sible tension between authors’ moral and material interests and users’ rights in culture, arts and science. 
First, they saw both sets of rights as compatible, interdependent and reinforcing each other. Neither the 
UDHR nor the ICESCR requires the protection of authors’ moral and material interests by means of exclusive 
rights, which is only one way of implementing these rights and the method which most likely causes ten-
sion between authors and users. Second, the protection of authors and users in Article 27 of the UDHR and 
Article 15 of the ICESCR is affected by, and dependent upon, the protection of their respective rights under 
other provisions, such as the ones relevant to property, freedom of expression, education, non-discrimina-
tion, development, and many other rights.97 When all these rights are in play, the mode of their national 
implementation and the way individuals practice them generate a series of tensions, such as the tension 
between users’ freedom of expression allowing the dissemination of intellectual works and authors’ moral 
interests or privacy rights entitling them not to publish their intellectual works. The practical and multi-
faceted nature of these tensions makes their prediction and solution go beyond the task of the drafters of 
 92 Authors’ moral interests—interpreted liberally—can also derive an important support from the human right to privacy. UDHR art 12:
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon 
his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
  See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 
UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 17 (codifying article 12 of the UDHR).
 93 Report of the High Commissioner (n 9) paras 11–12.
 94 ibid.
 95 Eg Gervais, ‘Intellectual Property and Human Rights’ (n 36) 19, 22.
 96 Green (n 84) para 2.
 97 General Comment No. 17 (n 6) paras 4, 35; General Comment No. 21 (n 7) paras 1–2.
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international human rights instruments, whose balancing mission ends by articulating the different human 
rights in the international human rights instruments. National parliaments and courts are better equipped 
to deal with this task in light of the specificities of their respective jurisdictions and the constitutional prin-
ciples drawn by international human rights law.98 
A. The Types of Balance 
Jurists have long debated the utility of balance as a metaphor in legal discourse. For instance, Professor Paul 
Kahn argues that balance as a judicial methodology is unacceptable because it is unable to produce princi-
pled justifications for its outcomes and allows the judiciary to intrude in the mission of the State’s political 
institutions.99 Professor Ronald Dworkin contends that the balance metaphor is misleading because it ‘sug-
gests a false description of the decision that the nation must make’.100 That is, it reflects a society-produced 
outcome of weighing the conflicting rights or freedoms instead of what justice requires.101 In contrast, Pro-
fessor Jeremy Waldron explains that individuals’ moral reasoning inevitably involves balancing.102 Pragmati-
cally, Judge Richard Posner argues that in situations where citizens’ rights and freedoms are to be weighed 
against the nation’s security, the metaphor of balance is ‘the proper way’103 of thinking: ‘[o]ne pan contains 
individual rights, the other community safety, with the balance needing and receiving readjustment from 
time to time as the weights of the respective interests change’.104 
Philosophers and jurists will always debate the value and fairness of balance and its different forms, yet 
today it is one of the fashionable terms used by courts to convey legitimacy on the process and outcome of 
their adjudication on human rights and freedoms.105 In following balance as a methodology or pursuing it 
as an outcome, courts usually attempt to find normative support in law, whether written or customary. For 
instance, the ECtHR has described the requirement to strike a balance between the human rights and free-
doms of individuals and the collective public interest of the whole community as ‘inherent’ in the ECHR.106 
Nonetheless, due to the diverse legal fields in which this concept is utilised, it may refer to different things 
depending on its application to the specific legal context.107 Therefore, it is important to clarify the meaning 
of balance with reference to the protection of authors’ and users’ human rights.
The meaning of balance in international human rights law is related to the ordinary dictionary defini-
tion.108 As Waldron notes, the metaphor of balance is applied in moral and political discourse ‘when there 
are things to be said on both sides of an issue, values that pull us in opposite directions’.109 Accordingly, 
balance first is the equal status that all human rights and freedoms enjoy in international human rights law 
consequent to their original allocation in their relevant instruments. In this respect, relevance to human 
dignity is the determinant of what rights or interests are included in the sacred list of human rights. Another 
important factor is public policy objectives that drafters of international human rights instruments may 
recognise as limitations on human rights and freedoms.110 As a result, the sum of the rights and freedoms in 
international human rights law and their limitations is the broad (or initial) balance presumed to have justly 
 98 Palomo Sánchez and Others v Spain (2012) 54 EHRR 24, paras 54–55 (stating that national courts are ‘in a better position than 
an international court’ to strike balance under the umbrella of article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
subject to the supervision of the European Court of Human Right (ECtHR)).
 99 Paul W Kahn, ‘The Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell’ (1987) 97 Yale LJ 1.
 100 Ronald Dworkin, ‘The Threat to Patriotism’ (2002) 49(3) New York Rev of Books 44.
 101 ibid.
 102 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Fake Incommensurability: A Response to Professor Schauer’ (1994) 45 Hastings LJ 813, 817.
 103 Richard A Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency (OUP 2006) 148.
 104 ibid.
 105 T Alexander Aleinikoff, ‘Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing’ (1987) 96 Yale LJ 943; Stavros Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality: An 
Assault on Human Rights?’ (2009) 7(3) ICON 468, 468.
 106 Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439, para 89. See also Alastair Mowbray, ‘A Study of the Principle of Fair Balance in the 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) 10 HRL Rev 289 (discussing the origins and applications of the 
principle of fair balance in Europe).
 107 See Jacco Bomhoff, ‘Balancing, the Global and the Local: Judicial Balancing as a Problematic Topic in Comparative (Constitutional) 
Law’ (2008) 31 Hastings Int’l & Comp L Rev 555; Jacco Bomhoff, ‘Genealogies of Balancing as Discourse’ (2010) 4 Law and Ethics 
of Human Rights 109, 109.
 108 See definitions (n 51) and (n 52).
 109 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Security and Liberty: the Image of Balance’ (2003) 11 J. Political Philos. 191, 192.
 110 eg ICCPR art 21: 
The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than 
those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. 
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been struck in international human rights law.111 Part of this balance, of course, is the rights of authors and 
users of intellectual works.
Second, balance is the desired and required outcome from the national implementation of States’ obliga-
tions under international human rights law.112 International human rights law sets up a broad and balanced 
framework of legal requirements that States need to comply with by adopting many measures, such as intro-
ducing legislation or allocating financial resources. One of the challenges that States face in implementing 
international human rights law is to give due recognition to all human rights. The protection of all human 
rights including those of authors and users is one of these challenges. The protection of authors’ human 
rights by means of copyright usually triggers some tension between the human rights of authors, the human 
rights of users, as well as other human rights. In this situation, States are required to develop a remedy that 
achieves a balance between the human rights of authors and the other sets of human rights. In this capacity, 
balance is practically a requirement of international human rights law. As General Comment No. 17 explains, 
it is an obligation on the Member States of the ICESCR to ‘strike an adequate balance between their obliga-
tions under Article 15, paragraph 1 (c), on one hand, and under the other provisions of the Covenant, on the 
other hand, with a view to promoting and protecting the full range of rights guaranteed in the Covenant’.113
Third, courts usually apply the technique of balance when adjudicating tensions between the human 
rights of individuals, such as the tension between individual A’s privacy rights and individual B’s freedom of 
expression, or between the public interest represented by the State and individuals’ human rights, such as 
in the tension between the public interest in investigating crimes and the privacy rights of the accused. In 
these contexts, the technique of balance is supposed to be a neutral judicial method of applying the law by 
solely interpreting its provisions: courts themselves do not give weight to the litigants’ rights or freedoms, 
but merely interpret their range and substance.114 Balance or balancing has become a ‘natural methodolo-
gy’115 for legal interpretation due to its ‘resonance with current conceptions of law and notions of rational 
decision making’.116
General Comment No. 17 explains that determining the content and scope of authors’ and users’ human 
rights must be by means of balance,117 which comprises its second and third types. Thus, the implementa-
tion of these rights must adhere to a set of rules regulating how their content is interpreted in relation to 
each other and in relation to other human rights. 
B. The Rules of Balance Implementation
Scholars have developed theoretical human rights frameworks for intellectual property protection. Profes-
sor Laurence Helfer proposes a human rights framework of intellectual property that would produce an 
‘irreducible core of rights’118 or ‘a core zone of autonomy’119 in which the moral and material rights of authors 
and creators are subject to fewer limitations and exceptions than the ones imposed now by the intellectual 
property regime.120 Outside this zone stands a set of rights that States need not protect; however, if States 
choose to protect them, these rights have to be balanced against the other economic, social, and cultural 
rights (ESCR).121 Helfer argues that a human rights framework of intellectual property may evolve to 1) 
produce stronger intellectual property rights; 2) impose external limits on intellectual property rights in 
addition to the known limitations and exceptions; or 3) create a human rights-focused regime which merely 
recognises intellectual property protection to the extent required to achieve the human rights outcome 
relating to poverty, health, education, and other aspects of human rights.122 
 111 Maria Foscarinis, ‘Homelessness and Human Rights: Towards an Integrated Strategy’ (2000) 19 St Louis U Pub L Rev 327, 345; 
UN General Assembly (GA), ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Strengthening of the Rule of Law’ (1 October 2004) 59th Session 
(2004) UN Doc A/59/402, para 25; Aeyal M Gross, ‘Human Proportions: Are Human Rights the Emperor’s New Clothes of the 
International Law of Occupation?’ (2007) 18 EJIL 1,1.
 112 Stephen J Toope, ‘Cultural Diversity and Human Rights’ (1997) 42 McGill LJ 169, 178.
 113 General Comment No. 17 (n 6) para 35.
 114 The Honourable Justice Frank Iacobucci, ‘“Reconciling Rights”: The Supreme Court of Canada’s Approach to Competing Charter 
Rights’ (2003) 20 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 137, 140.
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Professor Peter Yu takes Helfer’s framework further by focusing on the tensions generated inside a human 
rights framework of intellectual property and suggests some means for solving them. He emphasises the 
importance of identifying the attributes of intellectual property rights that are protected under human 
rights law and those attributes which are not.123 Further, he identifies two forms of conflict between human 
rights and intellectual property rights: external and internal.124 The external conflict is between intellectual 
property law and human rights law, which could be solved by giving priority to the human rights attributes 
of intellectual property by virtue of the principle of human rights primacy.125 With respect to the internal 
conflict, between the different rights protected in the human rights instruments, Yu argues that the princi-
ple of human rights primacy is inapplicable, but that the conflict may be resolved through three approaches: 
‘(1) the just remuneration approach, (2) the core minimum approach, and (3) the progressive realization 
approach’.126 Under the first approach, users have the freedom to use copyrighted works for the purpose of 
exercising their human rights, but this does not prejudice authors’ right to seek fair compensation.127 Under 
the second approach, States would not be in violation of the ICESCR if they offer authors less protection 
than that required by international copyright law as long as this protection satisfies the ‘core minimum 
obligations’128 under the ICESCR.129 And under the third approach, subject to the availability of resources, 
States will endeavour to comply with all their obligations with respect to the protection of authors’ human 
rights.130 
An additional human rights framework, influenced by human rights law jurisprudence, proposes three 
rules for balance implementation. First, the human rights of authors and users are not absolute. Second, 
there is no hierarchy between them. Third, both sets of rights are to be interpreted in light of all other inter-
national human rights and freedoms.131
1. No Absolute Rights
International human rights and freedoms are generally not absolute. The UDHR recognises their limited 
nature in Article 29: 
(1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his 
personality is possible.
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as 
are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the 
rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order 
and the general welfare in a democratic society.
(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles 
of the United Nations.132
Accordingly, States can impose legal limitations on human rights so long as these limitations are not arbi-
trary, in that they are necessary for the protection of others’ rights or freedoms or other societal values in 
a democratic society.133 For instance, in criminal law, imprisonment restricts the freedom of movement of 
the people convicted of murder, but the general and specific deterrence achieved by this punishment, as 
well as the limitation of the convicted person’s freedom of movement, is necessary for the protection of the 
human right to life of all the other members of the society. Furthermore, several international human rights 
instruments include provisions that allow Member States to restrict human rights and freedoms for public 
policy objectives, such as the protection of public health or national security. For example, paragraph 1 of 
 123 Yu, ‘Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property’ (n 19) at 1043.
 124 ibid 1044.
 125 ibid 1092. 
 126 ibid 1045. 
 127 ibid 1096.
 128 ibid.
 129 ibid 1106.
 130 ibid 1113.
 131 These rules are analogous to the principles of interpretation that the Supreme Court of Canada applies on the human rights and 
freedoms of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 
1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 2(b). For a discussion of these rules under Canadian law, see Ontario Human Rights Commission, Policy on 
Competing Human Rights (Ontario Human Rights Commission 2012); The Honourable Justice Iacobucci (n 114) 139–140.
 132 UDHR art 29. See similarly, ICESCR art 4.
 133 UDHR art 29; ICESCR art 4.
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Article 18 of the ICCPR grants everyone the human right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, but 
paragraph 3 of the same article allows prescribed limitations in law necessary for the protection of ‘public 
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others’.134 More profoundly, in 
situations of emergency, such as war, Article 4(1) of the ICCPR allows Member States to derogate from their 
obligations under the covenant by taking the necessary measures to respond to the emergency.135 However, 
the ICCPR includes a set of non-derogable rights, such as the right to life, freedom from slavery and freedom 
from torture.136
Likewise, the human rights of authors and users are subject to limitations. Authors’ moral and mate-
rial interests can be ‘subject to limitations and must be balanced with the other rights recognized in the 
[ICESCR]’.137 These limitations must be prescribed by law and intended for the promotion of societal wel-
fare.138 At the same time, they must be compatible with the nature of authors’ moral and material interests—
namely the protection of the personal link between authors and their intellectual works—and their role in 
enabling authors to achieve an adequate standard of living.139 For example, the State may have a framework 
allowing the unauthorised reproduction of intellectual works in formats specifically accessible to people 
with visual disabilities. This limitation however, may entitle authors to compensatory measures.140
Moreover, the protection of authors’ human rights to freedom of expression and property are also subject 
to limitations. Pursuant to Article 19(3) of the ICCPR, authors’ freedom of expression could be subject to 
limitations prescribed by law that are necessary for the respect of the rights of the others, or for the protec-
tion of national security, public order, public health or morals.141 Further, paragraph 2 of Article 17 of the 
UDHR impliedly allows deprivation of property in certain circumstances by prohibiting the arbitrary depri-
vation of property.
Equally, users’ human rights have their own limitations. General Comment No. 21 acknowledges that 
sometimes limiting the human right to participate in culture might be necessary.142 As with all other limita-
tions on ESCR, such limitations must satisfy the requirements of Article 4 of the ICESCR: that the limitation 
must be prescribed by law, targeting a legitimate objective, compatible with the nature of the limited rights, 
and necessary for the promotion of the general welfare in the community.143 An example of such limitations 
is the exclusive authors’ rights provided in copyright statutes which may impose limitations on how users 
enjoy their rights to access, use, and share culture. Users’ rights under freedom of expression are also subject 
to limitations by virtue of Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.144 Finally, their rights to education can be subject to 
limitations by virtue of Article 4 of the ICESCR.145 Practically however, the scarcity of financial resources is a 
serious limitation on the human right to education in general.146
The non-absolute nature of authors’ and users’ human rights is necessary to give effect to the meaning of 
balance in the implementation of these rights. Balance can take place only where the rights involved in the 
relationship are limited. For instance, when interpreting Article 3 of the ECHR on freedom from torture — a 
non-derogable freedom under the ICCPR147 — the ECtHR refused to balance this absolute freedom with the 
public interest in national security. Specifically, in case of Saadi v Italy,148 the ECtHR held that the assessment 
of the risk one imposes on a given community is irrelevant when the extradition of this person risks subject-
ing him or her to torture.149 
The non-absolute nature of authors’ and users’ human rights is what mandates and allows the balance 
between these rights. The limited nature of authors’ and users’ human rights creates a marginal but vital 
 134 ICCPR art 18.
 135 ibid.
 136 ibid art 4(2).
 137 General Comment No. 17 (n 6) para 22.
 138 ICESCR art 4; General Comment No. 17 (n 6) para 22.
 139 ICESCR art 4; General Comment No. 17 (n 6) para 23.
 140 General Comment No. 17 (n 6) para 24.
 141 ICCPR art 19(3)(a)-(b).
 142 General Comment No. 21 (n 7) para 19.
 143 ICESCR art 4.
 144 ICCPR art 19(3).
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zone surrounding their existence and allowing them to both lean toward and on each other without caus-
ing any of them to fall. In other words, the role of the limited nature of authors’ and users’ human rights in 
achieving their balanced implementation is like the small openings between the cogs of two meshing gears 
that allow them to be joined together and rotate in a synchronised manner. In this capacity, and thus in 
striking the balance, ‘the private interests of authors should not be unduly favoured and the public interest 
in enjoying broad access to their productions should be given due consideration’.150 This formula reflects 
the ‘intrinsically linked’ relationship between authors’ international human rights and users’ international 
human rights, which is a relationship ‘at the same time mutually reinforcing and reciprocally limitative’.151 
As implemented in international copyright law, authors’ and users’ human rights are limited. Users’ 
human rights are limited in relation to copyrighted works for the duration of copyright protection and 
authors’ human rights are limited by the exceptions and limitations to give some room for users’ human 
rights. However, to strike a balance between authors’ and users’ human rights under the umbrella of inter-
national copyright law it is not enough to establish copyright representing authors’ human rights, on the 
one hand, and exceptions and limitations representing users’ human rights, on the other hand. The degree 
of the mutual and reciprocal limitation between these rights greatly matters. It must be reasonable enough 
to enable both rights to have their due effect without one right defeating the purpose of the other. 
In contrast, the management of authors’ human rights and users’ human rights in international copyright 
law fails to preserve a reasonable degree of mutual limitation between both sets of rights. One reason for 
this imbalance is the important, yet controversial, principle of minimum standards of protection. Under this 
principle, members of the Berne Convention must not provide copyright protection below the standards 
prescribed in the Convention,152 except where the protection concerns works originating from their own 
nationals.153 The Berne Convention’s minimum standards include the term of protection, the subject matter 
protected by copyright, and the exclusive rights given to authors. Generally, the Berne Convention obliges 
Member States to provide copyright protection for a term that does not go below the life of the author plus 
fifty years after the author’s death,154 to provide copyright protection to ‘every production in the literary, 
scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression [. . .]’,155 and to provide 
authors with a bundle of exclusive economic rights and moral rights.156 The minimum standard approach of 
the Berne Convention has influenced TRIPS (except with respect to moral rights),157 the WCT,158 and ACTA.159
Giving due consideration to the limited nature of both authors’ and users’ human rights requires recon-
sideration of the minimum standard of protection principle in international copyright law. For example, 
the current term of copyright protection in the Berne Convention was added at the Brussels Revision of the 
Convention (1948) as a minimum right.160 In setting this term, the drafters intended to strike ‘a fair balance 
between the interests of authors and the need for society to have free access to the cultural heritage which 
last far longer than those who contributed to it’.161 Admittedly, the underlying logic behind the term of 
protection in the Berne Convention reflects awareness of users’ human rights. The term-limited protection 
requires sending to the public domain every work whose protection has expired. Nonetheless, a term of 
protection that exceeds the author’s lifetime automatically encroaches upon users’ human rights, since in 
international human rights law authors’ material interests only last for the life of the author.162 Thus, upon 
the author’s death all and full users’ human rights are supposed to become due, and any extension of protec-
tion thereafter is lacking a human rights foundation and must not infringe on users’ human rights. 
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 151 ibid para 4.
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Furthermore, the length of protection in the Berne Convention does not necessarily contribute to provid-
ing an adequate standard of living for authors,163 which is the essence of authors’ material rights in interna-
tional human rights law.164 That is, users’ human rights to access, use and share intellectual works might be 
postponed in favour of other rights not necessarily having a human rights character, such as when authors’ 
rights are assigned to corporations. It is true that the protection of the latter rights is important to redeem 
authors’ material interests in international human rights law, but a protection for the life of the author 
plus fifty years is excessive given the impact it has on users’ human rights to access, use and share culture. 
Herein, the useful role of copyright in fulfilling authors’ material interests might not outweigh its negative 
impact on users’ enjoyment of knowledge and the incentive to create further intellectual works: ‘knowledge 
is a hard commodity to appropriate, and it is socially inefficient to appropriate it’.165 Copyright can be a use-
ful vehicle to implement authors’ material interests, but it must not turn from being a shield against free 
riding into a sword undermining users’ ability to become (or continue being) authors.166 The current term 
of protection means that users will not be able to fully and freely enjoy intellectual works produced during 
their lifetime as protection may span up to three generations.167 Moreover, States are allowed to provide a 
longer term of protection, and many of them offer terms of protection that last for the life of the author plus 
seventy years after his or her death.168 Such terms render protection for copyrighted works produced today 
de facto unlimited for contemporary generations.169
In addition to the limited nature of authors’ and users’ human rights, another element of the balance 
between these two sets of human rights is the absence of any hierarchy between them. 
2. No Hierarchy between Rights
In national legal systems, legal rules exist in a normative hierarchy where constitutional rules take prec-
edence over primary and secondary legal rules, such as statutes and regulations.170 In many jurisdictions, 
nonetheless, there is no hierarchy between the different individuals’ human rights and freedoms within the 
constitution; all human rights and freedoms have the same legal weight. For example, the Supreme Court 
of Canada has warned against a ‘hierarchical approach’ toward interpreting the rights and freedoms of the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,171 and emphasised that attempts to give some of its rights and freedoms 
‘superior status in a “hierarchy” of rights must be rejected.’172 In a similar vein, the United States Supreme 
Court found no ‘distinction between, or hierarchy among, constitutional rights’173 since there was ‘no princi-
pled basis on which to create a hierarchy of constitutional values’.174 However, in Europe, the acceptability of 
this doctrine is less clear. In Germany, for instance, there is a debate among scholars regarding the existence 
of a hierarchy of rights in the Basic Law of Germany.175
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In international law, there is a disagreement on whether a hierarchy exists among its norms.176 This 
disagreement extends to cover the issue of whether a hierarchy exists within international human rights 
norms.177 Nonetheless, the closest hierarchy debate relevant to balancing authors’ and users’ rights regard-
ing intellectual works concerns the debate on assigning superiority to civil and political rights (CPR) over 
ESCR. As explained earlier, authors’ moral and material interests and users’ rights to culture, arts and science 
under Article 15 of the ICESCR and Article 27 of the UDHR are ESCR. At the same time, authors and users can 
protect the same rights relying on their CPR, such as freedom of expression, by means of the interdepend-
ence and indivisibility of human rights’ principles. This means that a tension between authors and users can 
result from the exercise of human rights that do not have the same nature: for example, ESCR of users versus 
CPR of authors. For balance to be possible in this case, it is important to reject any attempt to present one 
of these categories of human rights as superior to the other.
The attempts to give CPR superiority over ESCR date back to the time when the United Nations Commission 
on Human Rights took on the mission of drafting a single international legal instrument codifying and 
elaborating the aspirations of the UDHR.178 During this process, the ideological divide between the Western 
Bloc and the Eastern Bloc sparked the debate on the weight of both sets of human rights and, thus, the 
appropriateness of codifying them in one instrument.179 Specifically, the United States, leading the Western 
Bloc, viewed ESCR as a socialist notion and was reluctant to adopt a treaty that would put them on an 
equal footing with CPR.180 The argument was that ESCR were not justifiable and non-justiciable (that is, not 
legally enforceable rights by courts),181 but instead aspirations that required States to take positive measures 
to have them implemented, such as committing the allocation of economic resources.182 In contrast, the 
United States argued that CPR were ‘enforceable, justifiable, absolutely fundamental, and, therefore, imme-
diately applicable’.183 The Western countries emphasised that these rights were negative rights — liberties — 
that did not require the intervention of the State for their achievement but merely required it to refrain from 
interfering with them.184
The Soviet Union led the other view, supported by socialist States and third-world countries, arguing that 
ESCR were as important as CPR and that their protection was an essential requirement for the practical 
achievement of CPR.185 
At the end, the Commission on Human Rights drafted two independent treaties: the ICESCR and ICCPR.186 
Following this split, throughout the twentieth century, States emphasised CPR while overlooking ESCR.187 
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The premise of a hierarchy between CPR and ESCR is flawed.188 First, in its interpretation of the 
nature of States’ obligations under the ICESCR in General Comment No. 3, the CESCR has explained 
that ‘while the [ICESCR] provides for progressive realisation and acknowledges the constraints due to 
the limits of available resources, it also imposes various obligations which are of immediate effect’.189 
The CESCR has identified the ‘undertaking to guarantee [without discrimination]’ and the obligation to 
‘take steps’ as examples of obligations of immediate effect, which have ‘particular importance’ in inter-
preting the nature of States’ obligations under the ICESCR.190 Secondly, the CESCR has explained that 
the ICESCR imposes upon every Member State ‘a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction 
of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights’.191 For instance, a State in which 
most individuals lack access to necessary foodstuff, basic health care, housing, and very basic educa-
tion is not compliant with its obligations under the ICESCR.192 The State cannot discharge its obligation 
of taking steps to the maximum of its available resources unless it shows that ‘every effort has been 
made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those 
minimum obligations’.193
Thirdly, although the implementation of ESCR may require some greater allocation of resources, the 
implementation of many CPR — such as the voting right — involves an economic dimension, as they 
require governmental action and financial expenditure for their implementation.194 Also, several CPR are 
interlinked with ESCR.195 For instance, the right to education is said to be ‘adjunct’ or ‘part of’ political 
rights.196 This is why establishing a hierarchy between CPR and ESCR was rejected by the majority of the 
drafters of the UDHR, who viewed all the rights and freedoms of the declaration to have been ‘cut of the 
same moral cloth’197 and treated the UDHR as a ‘kingdom of human rights [where] there are no second-
class citizens.’198 Therefore, it is not surprising to see that all Western democracies, except the United 
States, endorse the legality and importance of ESCR.199
Similarly, in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, many national constitutions protect ESCR.200 In Canada, on 
the other hand, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not explicitly protect ESCR; however, bound by 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence,201 the Government of Canada has informed the CESCR that 
section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms202 ‘may be interpreted to include the rights protected under 
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the [ICESCR]’203 and is ‘guaranteeing that people are not to be deprived of basic necessities’.204 In return, the 
CESCR ‘note[d] with satisfaction that the Federal Government has acknowledged, in line with the interpreta-
tion adopted by the Supreme Court, that section 7 [. . .] guarantees the basic necessities of life, in accordance 
with [ICESCR]’.205
Finally, with respect to the non-justiciability of ESCR, in General Comment No. 9,206 the CESCR has 
explained that ‘there is no . . . [ICESCR] right which could not, in the great majority of systems, be consid-
ered to possess at least some significant justiciable dimensions’.207 Moreover, as aptly argued by Alston, 
international human rights law obligations are connected with the notions of ‘implementation’ and ‘super-
vision’ rather than ‘justiciability’ or ‘enforceability’; 208 this means that once States have obliged themselves 
to accept international obligations with regard to individuals’ rights and freedoms, they shall give effect to 
these obligations.209 In addition, available international mechanisms for supervising States’ compliance with 
their obligations under the ICESCR are sufficient to characterise those obligations as enforceable.210 Further, 
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights211 significantly 
boosts the implementation of the ICESCR.212 By virtue of this protocol, the CESCR has jurisdiction to receive 
complaints from individuals and communities alleging that States have violated their ESCR.213 Further, at 
the regional level, a number of human rights instruments have established considerable development with 
respect to the implementation of ESCR by entitling individuals to launch complaints against infringement 
of their ESCR.214 Nationally, the emergence of a body of national case law giving effect to ESCR has proven 
the fallacy of the non-justiciability argument against ESCR.215
As affirmed by the World Conference on Human Rights, ‘[a]ll human rights are universal, indivisible and 
interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair 
and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis.’216 By the same token, neither authors 
nor users of intellectual works can claim superiority over one another in human rights law by relying on 
a hierarchy between CPR and ESCR. Also, lawmakers and courts should avoid any hierarchy of this nature 
when balancing the human rights of authors and users. 
Rejecting a hierarchy between human rights, regardless of its basis, would expose a number of points of 
imbalance in international copyright law. For example, international copyright law incorporates a number 
of provisions that address users’ human rights, such as the provision excluding news of the day from copy-
right protection.217 This is a mandatory provision and meant, inter alia, to address users’ human right to 
freedom of expression,218 a civil and political right. On the other hand, international copyright law addresses 
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the human right to education — an economic, social and cultural right — in an optional provision relating to 
permitting the utilisation of copyrighted works by way of illustration in teaching activities.219 The mandatory 
protection of freedom of expression versus the optional protection of the human right to education creates 
a hierarchy between those human rights that is inconsistent with the requirements of balance in interna-
tional human rights law. This hierarchy echoes the historical discrimination against ESCR in favour of CPR.
Furthermore, whereas the Berne Convention and the WCT protect moral rights, TRIPS has dropped moral 
rights from its protection.220 In this regard, TRIPS creates a hierarchy between authors’ economic rights and 
moral rights. Given the importance of moral rights to the human author’s dignity, and given the trade envi-
ronment of TRIPS, one can further argue that TRIPS creates a hierarchy between the rights of the human 
authors and the economic rights of corporations, as a category of rights holders. As Gervais aptly described, 
by overlooking moral rights, TRIPS ‘split the copyright coin’.221 As a result, it ‘may have weakened the intrin-
sic equilibrium of copyright and, hence, the “power to convince” that copyright has traditionally enjoyed’.222 
Overlooking moral rights in TRIPS has tilted its balance toward the economic interests of copyright holders 
at the expense of authors’ moral interests.223 Given the declining importance of the Berne Convention as an 
independent international copyright instrument — outside the scope of its incorporation in TRIPS224 — one 
may reasonably infer a decline of the status of authors’ moral rights in international copyright law, which is 
injurious to the relation between this regime and international human rights law. Additionally, to the extent 
one finds in moral rights a right of users to receive authentic and accurate works, excluding moral rights 
from protection creates a hierarchy between the economic interests of rights holders and this implicit users’ 
right.
Moreover, in international copyright law, the principle of automatic protection, which provides that the 
existence and exercise of copyright must not be subject to any formalities,225 is central for the protection 
of authors’ human rights. It confirms that copyright implements, rather than creates, authors’ moral and 
material interests. On the other hand, this principle may impede the enjoyment of users’ human rights 
and, hence, it creates a hierarchy. For instance, the automatic protection, along with the long term of copy-
right protection, is responsible for the ‘orphan works’226 problem.227 Automatic protection requires users to 
assume that every intellectual work is protected even when it does not have an official registration record 
identifying its copyright owner and other relevant information, such as its date of publication.228 Fearing 
liability, users are hesitant to use works that might still be covered by copyright, and their search for the 
owner of the work to obtain permission to use it will usually involve extra time and financial expenses.229 
Although the simplest solution to this problem may be through a compulsory registration regime, that 
would violate the Berne Convention and TRIPS.230 
Thus, for example, the US Copyright Office’s Report on Orphan Works has suggested a statutory regime 
that only limits the responsibility of users of orphan works who, despite their good faith search, fail to 
locate the owners of such works and who, if possible, provide proper attribution to the author and copyright 
owner.231 
In Canada, the issue of orphan works is solved by section 77 of the Copyright Act,232 which authorises the 
Copyright Board to issue non-exclusive licenses to use orphan works.
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Europe has also developed a system allowing public libraries, educational institutions, museums, archives, 
and similar public interest establishments to make available to the public and reproduce orphan works.233
The rejection of a hierarchy between human rights is consistent with the holistic view of international 
human rights, which is another important rule of balance. 
3. Holistic View of Rights
A holistic approach to statutory interpretation means that courts will interpret a particular provision in a 
statute in light of ‘the whole statute (or statutes on the same subject) and the objects and policy of the law, 
as indicated by its various provisions, and give to it such a construction as will carry into execution the will 
of the Legislature, as thus ascertained, according to its true intent and meaning’.234 This ‘is the most realistic 
in view of the fact that a legislature passes judgment upon the act as an entity, not giving one portion of the 
act any greater authority than another’.235 Regarding human rights, this approach will ensure that ‘one right 
is not privileged at the expense of another’,236 and its applicability to the interpretation of international 
human rights law is in harmony with the fact that all human rights are equal, interdependent, indivisible, 
and necessary for the respect of the dignity of human beings. 
To achieve balance in the implementation of authors’ and users’ human rights, through legislation or 
adjudication, lawmakers and courts must interpret the content and boundaries of authors’ and users’ 
human rights in light of each other and in light of the whole corpus of international human rights. That is, 
each human right must not prejudice the content of any other human right. For instance, the protection of 
authors’ human rights must not prejudice others’ human rights to privacy or freedom of expression and the 
right to participate in culture must not impair authors’ human right to an adequate standard of living. The 
CESCR was clear that authors’ moral and material interests ‘cannot be isolated from the other rights recog-
nized in the Covenant’,237 such as the human right to education, food, health, an adequate standard of living, 
and other human rights recognised in the ‘International Bill of Human Rights and other international and 
regional instruments [. . .]’. 238 Therefore, every member of the ICESCR has a core obligation of immediate 
effect ‘to strike an adequate balance’ between the protection of authors’ moral and material interests and 
the protection of other ESCR.239
Since international copyright law creates some hierarchies between the human rights it regulates and has 
a low degree of limitation on copyright, it is inevitable that it will not be able to strike an appropriate bal-
ance between copyright and international human rights as a whole. For example, international copyright 
law does not have a specific exception or limitation that facilitates the role of archives and museums in 
the preservation of culture, it does not have a specific exception or limitation for libraries, and it does not 
include a mandatory first-sale doctrine that would protect the human right to property of purchasers of 
items embodying intellectual works. The situation of the human right to development240 in international 
copyright law is not more favourable. The balance between the interests of the developed countries in the 
protection and enforcement of copyright and the interests of the less developed countries in socio-economic 
development is one of the several forms of balance that international copyright law must strive to achieve.241 
However, since international copyright law’s minimum standards of protection apply in developed and less 
developed countries alike, despite countries’ different socio-economic circumstances surrounding the crea-
tion and use of copyrighted works, these standards create a formal, not substantive, balance.242 This means 
that international copyright law adopts a one-sided approach toward the protection of authors’ rights that 
may overlook other similarly important human rights. This is a serious concern linked to the overall fairness 
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of international copyright law and should be a trigger to introduce a ‘principle of substantive equality’243 
that renders the protection of copyright in international copyright law to be considerate of the development 
gap between countries.244 Professor Margaret Chon notes that the TRIPS regime focuses only on the eco-
nomic aspect of development by emphasising ‘utility maximization’245 and overlooks the social, cultural and 
political aspects of development.246 Thus, she argues that ‘[t]he net result is an intellectual property balance 
that has become increasingly lopsided in favor of producer interests, possibly to the detriment of overall 
global social welfare and clearly to the detriment of the most vulnerable populations’.247 TRIPS addresses the 
importance of access to, and use of, intellectual property for the development of less developed countries 
in Articles 7 and 8. These articles, however, according to the WTO panel in Canada—Patent Protection of 
Pharmaceutical Products, still await their appropriate interpretation.248 These two provisions are not manda-
tory; thus, their effect in creating substantive equality between the protection and enforcement of copyright 
and less developed countries’ socio-economic interests is quite limited.249 
V. Conclusion
Reaching a verdict on whether balance in international copyright law is compliant with the balance that 
international human rights law requires between authors’ and users’ human rights is a work in progress. 
International copyright law has yet to clarify the meaning and content of balance under its different instru-
ments. Furthermore, the High Commissioner of Human Rights and the CESCR have not distinguished the 
ambiguous balance in international copyright law from balance in international human rights law. There-
fore, international human rights law bodies and jurists should look at authors’ and users’ human rights — 
and the balance between them — through a human rights lens. A human rights balance between authors’ 
and users’ human rights means that the implementation and/or adjudication of these human rights must 
adhere to the following rules: both sets of human rights are reciprocally limited; they do not exist in a hier-
archy; and their proper interpretation occurs only in light of the interrelation and indivisibility of all interna-
tional human rights. Moreover, international copyright law bodies and jurists should carefully consider this 
human rights framework of balance in any future attempt to clarify the meaning and content of balance in 
international copyright law or to measure the compliance of the latter’s norms with international human 
rights law. Unless international copyright law adheres to balance within its meaning in international human 
rights law, the similarity between the balance that international copyright law claims to create between 
the different interests under its umbrella and the balance required under international human right law 
between authors’ and users’ human rights — and between these two sets of human rights and the whole 
body of human rights — remains one of terminology rather than ideology.
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